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Abstract:  
 
Management of fisheries for sustainability requires dealing with multiple and often conflicting 
objectives. A stochastic viability approach is proposed to address the trade-offs associated with 
balancing ecological, economic and social objectives in regulating mixed fisheries, taking into account 
the complexity and uncertainty of the dynamic interactions which characterize such fisheries. We focus 
on the demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay and more specifically on the fleets harvesting Norway 
Lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), Hake (Merluccius merluccius) and Sole (Solea solea). A bio-economic 
multi-species and multi-fleet model with technical interactions is developed to examine the trade-offs 
between preserving Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) of every species and maintaining the economic 
profitability of the various fishing fleets. Different management strategies are tested and compared. 
Results suggest that ensuring viability of this demersal fishery requires a significant decrease in fishing 
capacity as compared to the reference year. The simulations allow comparing the trade-offs 
associated with different allocations of this decrease across fleets. 
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1. Introduction
Marine biodiversity is under extreme pressure worldwide as a result of overexploita-
tion, pollution and habitat loss (Ye et al., 2012). Overcapacity and overfished populations,
as well as the indirect effects of fisheries on marine ecosystems, reflect the difficulties
faced by management in achieving the principal goal of sustainability. One of the reasons
put forward to explain the limited success of fisheries management is their frequent fo-
cus on single targeted species, rather than on the entire set of species affected by fishing.
Because such approaches ignore multi-species and multi-fleet interactions, their effective-
ness is limited where such interactions are an important driver of fishing mortality and
of economic profitability, particularly in mixed fisheries. Moreover, understanding the
trade-offs between ecological, economic and social objectives is important in designing
policies to manage ecosystems and fisheries (Cheung and Sumaila, 2008). As stressed by
Pikitch et al. (2004), Kempf (2010), there is nowadays widespread acceptance that a more
integrated perspective is needed, if these multiple objectives are to be successfully ad-
dressed in designing fisheries management regulations for sustainable use of marine living
resources.. However, the way to operationalize integrated approaches to the management
of mixed fisheries remains controversial as pointed out in Sanchirico et al. (2008), Doyen
et al. (2012). Single-species targets and reference points may still be appropriate, but need
to be adapted (Pikitch et al., 2004, Hall and Mainprize, 2004). Bio-economic models have
been proposed as a means to explore these issues, taking into account socio-economic
dimensions, and the complexity of feedback effects between anthropogenic activities and
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natural resources (Prellezo et al., 2012). Growing efforts have been made to develop mod-
elling approaches allowing to assess alternative management options for complex fishery
systems. Plaga´nyi (2007) provides an overview of the relative merits and limitations of
the different modelling approaches in this domain. Management Strategy Evaluation has
been widely recognised as a relevant framework to test the robustness of alternative man-
agement procedures to the uncertainties that characterize fishery systems (Punt and Smith,
1999, Kell et al., 2007). Using this framework, several applications have been developed
for the northern hake fishery (Murua et al., 2010, Garcia et al., 2011). Viability modelling
is also proposed by several authors (Be´ne´ et al., 2001, Cury et al., 2005, Eisenack et al.,
2006, Bene and Doyen, 2008, Baumga¨rtner and Quaas, 2009, Doyen et al., 2012) as a rele-
vant bio-economic modelling framework. Viability theory - introduced mathematically by
Aubin (1990) - aims at identifying decision rules such that a set of constraints, representing
various objectives, is respected at any time. It can be useful in multi-criteria contexts as
this approach exhibits a domain of possibilities, feasibility and trade-offs between poten-
tially conflicting objectives or constraints (Baumga¨rtner and Quaas, 2009). The approach
is also closely related to the maximin, or Rawlsian, approach with respect to intergenera-
tional equity (Martinet and Doyen, 2007, Doyen and Martinet, 2012) as constraints can be
assumed to apply throughout both present and future time periods. Furthermore, stochas-
tic viability (Doyen and De Lara, 2010) can handle issues of bio-economic vulnerability,
risks, safety and precaution by compiling ecological and economic goals in a random con-
text and expanding the Population Viability Analysis (PVA) used in conservation biology
to address extinction risks for populations. The viability approach has been applied to the
bio-economic management of renewable resource systems, especially fisheries in Be´ne´
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et al. (2001), Eisenack et al. (2006), only a few of which are dedicated to case studies with
real data (Mullon et al., 2004, Martinet et al., 2007, De Lara et al., 2007, Chapel et al.,
2008, Doyen et al., 2012).
The objective of the present paper is to use the framework of viability analysis to ad-
dress the formal modelling of trade-offs between conflicting objectives in the management
of a mixed fishery. We apply the framework to the Bay of Biscay demersal mixed fish-
ery. A discrete-time stochastic bio-economic model is developed and calibrated based on
the data available on the fishery. The model is used to explore alternative management
strategies, with particular emphasis on those which allow joint ecological-economic via-
bility of three main exploited fish species - Norway Lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), Hake
(Merluccius merluccius) and Sole (Solea solea) and of the sixteen sub-fleets (trawlers and
gill-netters) harvesting these species.
2. Material and methods
2.1. The Bay of Biscay case study
The Bay of Biscay demersal mixed fishery operates in divisions VIIIa and b of the
ICES grid (Figure 1). French, Spanish and Belgian fishery fleets operate in this area. The
main gears used in these fisheries are trawl, gill-net and longline, and all induce variable
levels of impacts on a wide range of species. Under the European data collection frame-
work for fisheries, a number of fishery-independent surveys, data collection programs,
stock assessments based on virtual population analysis (vpa) models (ICES, 2009) and
research projects have been carried out over the years (ICES, 2009, http://www.ices.
dk/datacentre/StdGraphDB.asp, http://www.umr-amure.fr/pg_partenarial_
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Figure 1: ICES Divisions VIIIa,b Source: Macher et al. (2008)
bioeco.php), which provide both biological and economic information that can be used
to calibrate a bio-economic model of the French component of the fishery1. According
to Daure`s et al. (2008) among the 200 species caught in the Bay of Biscay, 20 species
correspond to 80% in volume of the landings in 2007. Three of the most important species
in percentage of the total French national landing value include Nephrops (6 %), Hake (7
%) and Sole (11 %). The model we develop aims to represent the dynamics of these three
1Only French economic data were available for this study.
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species.
The French fleets which target these species can be separated in four main groups of
vessels based on their main gear used and structure of landings: Nephrops trawlers, various
fish trawlers, Sole gill-netters and various fish gill-netters (Macher et al., 2011). These four
fleets involved 577 vessels in 2008 and their total turnover amounted to 206 millione. The
four fleets can be further sub-divided into sixteen sub-fleets according to the length-class
of vessels and their associated cost structure. A 17th fleet is also considered in the model
to account for the fishing mortalities caused by vessels that do not belong to the sixteen
sub-fleets, particularly Spanish and Belgian vessels.
Figures 2 and 3 capture the major interactions in the Bay of Biscay mixed demersal
fishery which are taken into account in our analysis. Technical interactions between fleets
are illustrated in the figure 2, which shows the estimated number of individual fish caught
by each fleet during the year 2008. These numbers include landed but also discarded
individuals. Bottom trawls, in particular, are poorly selective gears and their use induces
catches of non-targeted fishes (by-catch and by-product) or unwanted length grades of the
targeted species. Most of these catches are usually discarded (ICES, 2009). In the Bay
of Biscay, Nephrops and Hake are the most discarded species in weight and numbers.
While the Nephrops trawlers target mainly Nephrops, they also have an important impact
on juvenile Hake (as shown by figure 2) due to the fact that the Nephrops fishing grounds
are located on a Hake nursery area. Discarding leads to negative impacts on stock renewal
as discards have a high mortality rate (Gue´guen and Charuau, 1975, Alverson et al., 1994).
However, neither the Nephrops trawlers nor the various fish trawlers depend on Hake for
their revenue, as shown in figure 3 which illustrates the contribution of each species to the
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gross income of each fleet. This is characteristic of a technical interaction in which the
fishing mode of Nephrops trawlers has an unsought joint impact on Hake resources, which
affects mainly other fleets for which this species is an important source of revenue. Many
other similar interactions exist between sub-fleets, as illustrated by the figure 3.
Figure 2: Stylized representation of the Bay of Biscay mixed demersal fishery used as a basis to develop the
bio-economic model. The width of the arrows is proportional to the percentage of total number of individual
fish caught by the fleets in 2008, including both landings and discards.
The management of these fisheries mainly relies on conservation measures: a Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) revised each year, a minimum landing size (MLS) and a minimum
trawl mesh size. Nephrops are targeted by bottom trawlers on a sand-muddy area called
”La Grande Vasie`re” (Figure 1). A major part of the Nephrops landings (in weight) from
VIIIa,b are taken by French trawlers. The figure 2 shows that a large amount of Nephrops
are caught by the “other fleets” fleet, however most of these individuals are not landed.
7
Figure 3: Stylized representation of the contribution of each species to the gross income of each fleet in
2008. The width of the arrows is proportional to the contribution (in percentage) of each species to the total
gross income of each fleet.
They correspond for most of them to individuals below the minimum landing size. The
Nephrops trawler fleet is one of the most important segments of the French fleet in the
Bay of Biscay (ICES, 2010). The fleet indeed represents about one quarter of the French
trawlers in this area. With regards to access regulations, a limited entry license system has
been enforced since 2005. However, it does not include individual limitations of effort or
catches. The high level of catches and discards of younger age groups below the MLS
contributes to economic inefficiency of the exploitation (Macher and Boncoeur, 2010).
The stock was assessed in 2008 and ICES concluded that its SSB was relatively stable and
advised to maintain current landings. The agreed TAC for 2008 was 4320t. The important
hake by-catch previously mentioned mainly affects the fleets that depend strongly on Hake,
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which include French gill-netters (accounting for around 30% of total landings) as well as
Spanish fleets (accounting for around 53% of total landings in 2008) (Macher et al., 2011).
The Hake TAC in 2008 was set at 54,000 tonnes, including 20,196 tonnes for the Bay of
Biscay area. The Bay of Biscay Sole fishery has two main components: a French gill-net
fishery directed at Sole and a French and Belgian trawl fishery. The French fleet is the
most important participant in the fishery with landings being close to 90% of the total
international landings, over the available historical series since 1979. The Sole landings in
the Bay of Biscay are subject to a TAC regulation in combination with technical measures.
The 2008 TAC was set at 4582 tonnes.
2.2. The bio-economic model
The bio-economic model we develop captures the main features of the technical inter-
actions which exist between the various components of the Bay of Biscay demersal fishery
as described in the previous section. Due to data availability constraints, the focus of the
analysis is on the bio-economic outcomes of alternative management strategies for the
French fleets. However, the model also captures the influence of foreign fleets on the dy-
namics of the system, and on the potential outcomes of alternative management strategies
targeted at the French fleets. The model relies on the mathematics of controlled dynamic
systems (Clark, 1976) and more specifically of discrete time systems (De Lara and Doyen,
2008). It extends the bio-economic model presented in Doyen et al. (2012) in which only
Hake and Nephrops were taken into account, and only two aggregated fishing fleets were
explicitly represented. Based on the existing understanding of trophic structures in the
Bay of Biscay demersal ecosystem Le Loc’h and Hily (2005), no trophic interactions are
assumed between these species.
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2.2.1. A multi-species, multi-fleets, age-structured dynamic framework
Fish population dynamics are modelled using an age-structured population model de-
rived from the standard fish stock assessment approach (Quinn and Deriso, 1999). Pop-
ulation dynamics are described on a yearly basis and integrate uncertainties regarding
recruitment. The age-structured dynamics of the three species are governed by :

Ns,a(t + 1) = Ns,a−1(t) exp
(−Ms,a−1 − Fs,a−1), a = 2, . . . , As − 1
Ns,As(t + 1) = Ns,As−1(t) exp
(−Ms,As−1 − Fs,As−1)
+Ns,As(t) exp
(−Ms,As − Fs,As).
(1)
where Ns,a(t) stands for the abundance of the exploited species s = 1, 2, 3 (Nephrops, Hake
and Sole, respectively) at age a = 1, . . . , As. Thus the state Ns,a(t + 1) of the stock at time
t + 1 evolves according to both natural Ms,a and total fishing Fs,a mortality rates of the
species s at age a. Total fishing mortality of species s at age a Fs,a is derived from the sum
of fishing mortality from all 17 sub-fleets in year t0, Fs,a, f (t0) and from the fishing effort
multipliers u as described in equation (2):
Fs,a =
17∑
f =1
u f Fs,a, f (t0). (2)
with u f that stands for the fishing effort multiplier of the sub-fleet f . Effort multipliers
are defined as the ratio of sub-fleet fishing effort as compared to fishing effort in a reference
year, and are introduced as control variables to define management strategies. In this study,
effort multipliers are applied to the number of vessels per sub-fleet. The reference year is
set at t0 = 2008. Fishing mortalities depend both on the fishing effort by vessel (number
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of days at sea) and the number of vessel by sub-fleet (see the equation (7)). The biological
parameters are described in the appendix in tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 for Nephrops, Hake
and Sole respectively. The estimated values of Fs,a, f (t0), the fishing mortality of the species
s at age a induced by the sub-fleet f in 2008, include both landed and discarded fish, and
are detailed in the appendix tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 for Nephrops, Hake and Sole. The
parameter values are derived from the ICES databases2, reports of the Working Group on
the Assessment of Southern Shelf Stocks of Hake, Monk and Megrim (WGHMM) (ICES,
2009) and the Ifremer, SIH, DPMA databases 3.
2.2.2. Introducing stochastic recruitment functions
Recruitment involves complex biological and environmental processes that vary over
time. The recruits Ns,1(t + 1) for each species are therefore assumed to be uncertain func-
tions of the Spawning Stock Biomass at time t:
Ns,1(t + 1) = ϕs
(
SSBs(t), ωs(t)
)
. (3)
The Spawning Stock Biomass SSBs(t) of the species s is given by:
SSBs(t) =
As∑
a=1
γs,aυs,aNs,a(t), (4)
2http://www.ices.dk/datacentre/StdGraphDB.asp
3DPMA stands for Direction des Peches Maritimes et de lAquaculture which corresponds to the Direc-
torate for Sea Fisheries and Aquaculture at the French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. SIH stands
for Systeme dInformation Halieutique, the fisheries information system monitored by Ifremer, the French
Research Institute for the Exploitation of the Sea (http://wwz.ifremer.fr/institut_eng).
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with (γs,a)a=1,...,As the proportions of mature individuals of species s at age a and (υs,a)a=1,...,As
the weights of individuals of species s at age a. The function ϕs represents the specific
stock-recruitment relationship of each species s while ωs(t) stands for uncertainties af-
fecting the stock recruitment relationships through different possible scenarios Ω. In the
present case-study, following STECF (2008) and the approach adopted by the working
group WGHMM, the recruitment relationship of the species is set using an Ockham-Razor
function as in O’Brien et al. (2002):
ϕs(SSBs, ωs) =

ωs { Us if SSBs ≥ Blims ,
SSBs
Rs
Blims
if SSBs ≤ Blims .
(5)
Here Us stands for the uniform distribution relying on Rts, the historical time series
of recruitment of species s4 (ICES, 2009) . ICES limit reference biomass Blims and the
mean historical recruitment Rs values are specified in table A.7 of the appendix. The three
species have different biology and life cycles, therefore we assume that their recruitments
are uncorrelated.
2.2.3. Catches and fishing mortality
For each period t, the exploitation of the three species is described by the catches
Cs,a, f (t). These catches depend on initial fishing mortalities Fs,a, f (t0), effort multipliers u f
4Ris is the sample i for the species s and P(ϕs = R
i
s) =
1
I with I the number of possible values. Gaussian
and continuous uniform distributions were also tested but did not significantly modify the results. Further-
more this “historical data series” method is used by the scientists of the working group WGHMM of ICES.
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and abundances Ns,a(t) through the Baranov catch equation:
Cs,a, f (t) = Ns,a(t)u f Fs,a, f (t0)
1 − exp
−Ms,a − N f∑
f =1
u f Fs,a, f (t0)

Ms,a +
N f∑
f =1
u f Fs,a, f (t0)
. (6)
The initial fishing mortality Fs,a, f (t0) can be expressed as:
Fs,a, f (t0) = qs,a, f e f (t0)K f (t0), (7)
where e f (t0) is the mean value of fishing effort by vessels of sub-fleet f expressed in
number of days at sea and K f (t0) is the number of vessels by sub-fleet f , both for the
baseline year 2008. Their values are given in table A.11 in the appendix. The catchability
qs,a, f corresponds to the fishing mortality of species s at age a associated with one unit of
fishing effort from a vessel of sub-fleet f . Catchabilities are assumed constant over the
simulation period.
2.2.4. Income
The gross income from catches of each sub-fleet Inc f (t) is then estimated by introduc-
ing the market price of the species along with the estimates of discard rates, such that:
Inc f (t) =
∑
s
As∑
a=1
ps,a(ω˜s(t))υs,a, f Cs,a, f (t)(1 − ds,a, f ). (8)
where υs,a is the mean weight of landed individuals of species s at age a and ds,a, f repre-
sents the discard rate of individuals of age a by the sub-fleet f . Discard ratios were cal-
13
ibrated on the data available from the ICES working group WGHMM.5 Price ps,a(ω˜s(t))
corresponds to the market value (euros by kg) of species s at age a for year t under the
stochastic scenario ω˜s(t). Uncertainties on annual mean market price by species are intro-
duced through a random mean price by species following a Gaussian law as:
ps(ω˜s) { N(µPs , σPs ). (9)
Gaussian laws are calibrated from ex-vessel prices for the three species for the 2000-2009
period, recorded in French harbours (data from Ifremer, SIH, DPMA). Prices by species
ps(ω˜s(t)) are assumed to be independent by species and by year. Market price ps,a(ω˜s(t))
by age a are computed from the annual price by species ps(ω˜s(t)) as follows:
ps,a(ω˜s(t)) = ps(ω˜s(t))Υs,a. (10)
with Υs,a, an age price coefficient Υs,a calibrated from 2008 market prices for the three
species and for different market categories (defined in terms of the size/age of fish) (Ifre-
mer/SIH/DPMA). Parameters of the Gaussian law (µPs , σ
P
s ) for each species and age price
coefficient Υs,a by species s and age a are displayed in the appendix in tables A.1, A.2 and
A.3.
5A difference in discards between the Nephrops trawlers and the various fish trawlers was observed. The
Nephrops trawlers appear to have a larger impacts on the first age class of Hake than the other trawlers.
As discarding rates for Hake and Sole are not known per sub-fleet, we assume that discarding rates are the
same for each sub-fleet, equal to the discarding rate of the whole fleet and assumed to be constant over the
simulation period. For the same reason, fishing mortality is allocated between the sub-fleets according to
their contribution to total landings (see in the appendix: tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 for the values of fishing
mortalities by sub-fleet for Nephrops, Hake and Sole and the tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 for the estimated
discards).
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2.2.5. Profits
The economic viability per sub-fleet is assumed to be determined by their economic
profitability, that is the difference between their gross income and their costs. The profit
pi f of a sub-fleet f is estimated as follows:
pi f (t) =
(
Inc f (t)+α f u f K f (t0)e f (t0)
)
(1−τ f )−
(
V f uelf p f uel(t)e f (t0)+c
var
f e f (t0)+c
f ix
f
)
u f K f (t0).
(11)
Here the parameter α f corresponds to the income per unit of effort of sub-fleet f derived
from catches of species not explicitly modelled. Incomes from other species are including
in an additive fashion as in Raveau et al. (2012). We assume that biomass and price
of other species are constant, and that the impacts of modelled fleets on these species
are relatively negligible. Rate τ f is the landing cost by sub-fleet as a proportion of the
gross income6. V f uelf corresponds to the volume of fuel (in litres) used by fishing effort
unit (i.e. days at sea) for one vessel of sub-fleet f and p f uel(t) is the fuel price by litre
of the year t that can be subjected to projection scenarios. The other variable cost cvarf
of a fishing effort unit by a vessel of sub-fleet f includes oil, supplies, ice, bait, gear
and equipment costs while c f ixf corresponds to the annual costs associated with vessel of
the sub-fleet f , including maintenance, repair, management and crew costs, fishing firms,
licenses, insurance premiums and producer organisation charges. Cost parameter values
in the model are based on the economic data available for 2008 (Ifremer, SIH, DPMA)
6τ f could potentially and theoretically be used as policy instrument through a landing tax. However, τ f
is here considered as a landing cost, a levy ad valorem which is paid for landing services. The differences
between these landing costs by sub-fleet, displayed in table A.12 , relate to the different locations of landings,
and associated costs of landing services.
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and are assumed to be constant over the simulation period. As mentioned in section 2.2.1,
u f corresponds to the fishing effort multiplier of sub-fleet f and is applied to the number
of vessels per sub-fleet 7. The full set of previous parameters used to estimate profits is
displayed in the tables A.11 and A.12 in the appendix.
2.3. Fuel scenarios
As regards fuel price, two different scenarios are considered: a base case scenario BC
where fuel price p f uel(t) is assumed to be steady over the simulation period and a most
likely scenario ML where fuel price increases over time. Fuel prices under the most likely
scenario are based on projections from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010, CAS,
2012). Table 1 summarizes both fuel scenarios.
Table 1: Fuel price scenarios (in each row) considered in this study. Source:(IEA, 2010, CAS, 2012).
Scenarios Description
BC Base case scenario: constant fuel prices
p f uel(t) = p f uel,re f = 0.50 e/L
ML Most likely scenario: increase of fuel price
p f uel(t) = p f uel,re f for t=1
p f uel(t) = p f uel(t − 1) + 0.03 for t=2,. . . , 7
p f uel(t) = p f uel(t − 1) + 0.0115 for t=8,. . . , 12
p f uel(t) = p f uel(t − 1) + 0.0135 for t=13,. . . , 20
7It is most likely that in circumstances where a decrease in capacity was required to maintain long-term
viability of the fishery, the fleets would first try to modulate their fishing effort (and associated variable
costs) before vessels left the fishery. Therefore, we first tried to use fishing effort of the sub-fleets as a
control. However, it turns out that economic issues in the fishery arise mainly from the annual, rather than
variable, cost component of profits.
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2.4. The co-viability diagnostic
The viability framework of analysis is used to describe trade-offs associated with al-
ternative management approaches for the fishery. This requires the specification of con-
straints which capture the different objectives that may be pursued in managing the fishery.
Given the stochastic nature of the model (i.e. uncertainties on recruitments and market
prices), the performance of management strategies must be assessed in terms of the prob-
ability for these constraints to be met by the fishery at any point in time, under alternative
scenarios (Doyen and De Lara, 2010). We consider two sets of constraints to define the
viability of the fishery: the first set of constraints relates to the population viability of the
three species; the second set of constraints relates to the economic viability of each individ-
ual sub-fleet. Our set of biological constraints is related to Population Viability Analysis
(PVA), well-known in biological conservation sciences (Morris and Doak, 2002). Popula-
tion Viability Analysis (PVA) is a process of identifying the threats faced by a species and
evaluating the likelihood that it will persist into the future. PVA is defined as the require-
ment that the Spawning Stock Biomass of each individual species is maintained above a
threshold value. In this study, the thresholds correspond to Bpas , the biomass of precaution
of the species s estimated by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. The
constraint is specified as:
SSBs(t) ≥ Bpas , s = 1, 2, 3. (12)
The ecological performance of a management strategy, involving a particular vector of
effort multipliers by sub-fleet u, can be assessed by the population viability probability
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PPVA(u), as described by :
PPVA(u) = P
(
constraints (12) are satisfied for t = t0, . . . ,T
)
. (13)
We also consider the economic objective of maintaining positive profits for the sub-fleets
over time (Economic Viability Analysis, EVA):
pi f (t) > 0, f = 1, . . . , 16. (14)
The economic viability probability of the fishery related to a vector of effort multipliers
PEVA(u) is thus expressed by:
PEVA(u) = P
(
constraints (14) are satisfied for t = t0, . . . ,T
)
. (15)
In effect, this constraint aims to keep each segment of the fishery active (at positive
profit levels), and the related social benefits of maintaining employment in each sub-fleet.
Given that the sub-fleets are distributed across different coastal regions of the Bay of Bis-
cay, this also ensures the maintenance of active commercial fishing operations and em-
ployment all along the coastline from which the fishery operates. The objective thus de-
fined is in fact akin to a social constraint, as it essentially requires that levels of economic
profitability achieved by sub-fleets allow these sub-fleets to continue participating in the
fishery. In this sense, it is similar to the participation constraint defined by Pe´reau et al.
(2012) in their bio-economic analysis of the effects of ITQ regulations on fisheries.
Co-Viability Analysis (CVA) of the fishery combines PVA and EVA and seeks to assess
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whether a management strategy allows for both sets of constraints to be observed simul-
taneously. The ecological and economic viability constraints characterize an acceptable
sub-region of the phase space within which the fishery evolves. A particular trajectory fol-
lowed by the fishery will be called viable if it remains in this region during the prescribed
period of time, with a sufficiently high probability. Thus the bio-economic performance
of a management strategy entailing a particular vector of effort multipliers u can be evalu-
ated by the probability of co-viability of the fishery under this strategy, as defined by the
equation (16) :
PCVA(u) = P
(
constraints (12) and (14) are satisfied for t = t0, . . . ,T
)
. (16)
Of particular interest are the vectors of effort multipliers by sub-fleet u such that the prob-
ability of co-viability PCVA is high enough :
PCVA(u) ≥ β,
where β stands for some confidence rate (typically 90%, 95% or 100%).
2.5. Management strategies
We compare different management strategies relying on different combinations of ef-
fort multipliers u f . In particular, we compare approaches which would focus on partial
management of the fishery, centred on the bio-economic viability of harvesting a partic-
ular species, with strategies which attempt to manage the mix of species and fleets as a
whole. The associated effort multipliers can differ between sub-fleets but it is assumed
for sake of simplicity that they remain constant over time. Projections are computed over
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twenty years (T = 2028) starting from the initial stock abundances N(t0) at year t0 = 2008.
The values of initial states are given by tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix. For each
management strategy, viability probabilities are approximated by the proportion of viable
trajectories among 1000 simulated trajectories. Each trajectory corresponds to different
recruitment levels ω(.) = (ω1(.), ω2(.), ω3(.)) and prices ω˜(.) = (ω˜1(.), ω˜2(.), ω˜3(.)) for the
three species, randomly selected every year according to equations (5) and (9). These ωi
and ω˜i are assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
In the following paragraphs we outline the specifications of each strategy.
The status quo (SQ) strategy simulates continued fishing mortalities at levels observed
in the 2008 baseline year:
usqf = 1, ∀ f = 1, . . . , 16.
The net present value strategy unpv is a conventional economic strategy where a central
planner aims at maximizing the expected sum of discounted profits at the scale of the
entire fishery. There is no guarantee that the profit of each sub-fleet will be positive due
to the absence of constraints on these profits. The net present value is calculated as the
aggregated value of discounted profits over all the sub-fleets:
NPV(u) = E
 T∑
t0
1
(1 + ρ)t
16∑
f =1
pi f (t)
 , (17)
where the discount rate is set to ρ = 4%8. The combination of effort multipliers which
8This value of discount rate is used for the evaluation of public projects in France (Portney and Weyant,
1999, Lebe`gue, 2005).
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define this strategy unpv, is such that:
NPV(unpv) = max
u
NPV(u). (18)
The co-viability strategy ucva intends to guarantee both the conservation of Spawning
Stock Biomass of all three species and the economic viability of all the fishing sub-fleets.
A central planner requires that both the ecological and economic constraints defined in (12)
and (14) are satisfied. The associated combinations of effort multipliers ucva are identified
such that they maximize the co-viability probability PCVA(u) described in (16):
PCVA(ucva) = max
u
PCVA(u). (19)
Capital inertia and the related difficulties in reducing excess capacity in fisheries are
important issues which often plague fisheries management policies (Nøstbakken et al.,
2011). To take this constraint into account, the selection of management strategies is
carried out such that the distance between the values of u f and status quo usqf is minimized,
ensuring that the capacity adjustments identified as viable entail the least changes in fleet
sizes possible. In other words,
|ucva − usq| = min
(
|u − usq|, PCVA(u) = max
z
PCVA(z)
)
(20)
The Sole (SOL) strategy investigates a mono-specific management strategy focused on
the viability of the Sole fishery. In this sense it is a less cooperative strategy than cva. The
effort multipliers usol only account for constraints on the Sole SSB3(t) and profitability
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goals pi f (t) f =8,...,11 for the Sole gill-netter sub-fleets ( f = 8, . . . , 11):

SSB3(t) ≥ Bpa3 ,
pi f (t) > 0 for f = 8, . . . , 11,
u f = 1 for f , 8, . . . , 11.
(21)
The associated effort multipliers usol are obtained by maximizing the probability that the
Sole viability objectives will be met, as follows:
usol ∈ Argmax
u
P
(
constraints (21) are satisfied for t = t0, . . . ,T
)
. (22)
Again, among the different solutions usol, the one with minimal capacity change are se-
lected as in (20).
The Nephrops (nep) strategy investigates a mono-specific management strategy fo-
cused on the Nephrops fishery. Similarly to the sol strategy, the effort multipliers unep
are selected such that only the constraints related to the stock of Nephrops SSB1(t) and to
profits pi f (t) f =1,2,3 of the Nephrops trawlers ( f = 1, 2, 3) are considered:

SSB1(t) ≥ Bpas ,
pi f (t) > 0 for f = 1, 2, 3,
u f = 1 for f , 1, 2, 3.
(23)
Viable combinations of effort multipliers unep are identified by maximizing the probability
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that these objectives are met, as follows:
unep ∈ Argmax
u
P
(
constraints (23) are satisfied for t = t0, . . . ,T
)
. (24)
Again, as in (20), among the different solutions unep, the one with minimal capacity change
are chosen.
The numerical implementations and computations of the model have been carried out
with the scientific software scilab9 5.2.2. The nonlinear optimization problems (equa-
tions (18), (19), (22) and (24)) were solved numerically using the Scilab routine entitled
“optim ga” which relies on a genetic algorithm 10.
3. Results
Outcomes of the five strategies under both fuel scenarios are compared according to the
combinations of effort multipliers which they entail, and to their ecological and economic
performances (ecological, economic and co-viability probabilities, as well as net present
values).
Figure 4 displays the effort multipliers u f by sub-fleet which met the objectives for
9scilab is a freeware http://www.scilab.org/ dedicated to engineering and scientific calculus. It is
especially well-suited to deal with dynamic systems and control theory.
10See http://help.scilab.org/docs/5.3.3/en_US/optim_ga.html for details on “optim ga”.
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a search procedure based on Darwinian “survival of the fittest” theory. GAs
were developed to solve optimisation problems based on the mechanics of natural selection and genetics
such as inheritance, mutation, selection and crossover. The artificial implementation of the natural selec-
tion and reproduction into genetic operations have been shown to optimize design problems (Fleming and
Purshouse, 2002). GAs optimize by evolving or generating successive populations from an initial random
population of individuals to improved populations. This type of numerical method has already been used
for bio-economic purposes, for instance in Mardle and Pascoe (2000) and in Sathianandan and Jayasankar
(2009).
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each strategy under both fuel scenarios. For some management strategies, multiple viable
solutions (i.e. effort multiplier values by fleet) are found, therefore effort multipliers on
figure 4 are represented by boxplots where range, median and quartiles are represented. To
illustrate the fact that, despite the existence of multiple solutions, all combinations of the
viable effort multiplier values identified for these sub-fleets are not possible, two particu-
lar sets of viable effort multipliers are shown. Table 2 gives the ecological, economic and
co-viability probabilities and net present values associated to the five strategies under both
scenarios. The viability probabilities and net present values are calculated using equations
(13), (15), (16) and (17), respectively. Table 2 also provides the number of viable combi-
nations of effort multipliers that were obtained by strategy. Figures 5 and 6 synthetize the
bio-economic scores and trade-offs. Results are detailed in the following subsections.
Table 2: Range of the ecological and economic viability probabilities (PPVA, PEVA), co-viability probabilities
(PCVA) and net present value (NPV) of total fishery profits associated to combinations of effort multipliers
obtained for each management strategy. Number of different optimal combination are also given.
Strategies
PPVA
(in %)
PEVA
(in %)
PCVA
(in %)
NPV
(in millions of e)
Nb of different
solutions
sqBC 98.5 31.1 30.5 685.1 1
sqML 98.5 0 0 525.8 1
npvBC 100 0 0 1016.6 1
npvML 100 0 0 934.3 1
cvaBC 100 95 - 96.3 95 - 96.3 654.4 - 748.6 41
cvaML 100 94.4 94.4 396.3 - 429.6 53
solBC 100 31.5 - 31.7 31.5 - 31.7 709.4 - 711.2 52
solML 100 0 0 569.2 - 571.4 42
nepBC 98.4- 98.7 28.8 - 33.8 .28.3 - 33.3 658.2 - 713.7 83
nepML 98.7 0 0 555.3 - 562.3 45
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(a) Nephrops trawlers.
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(b) Various fish trawlers.
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(c) Sole gill-netters.
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(d) Various fish gill-netters.
Figure 4: Range of the effort multipliers values u f for the different sub-fleets f and the five strategies
(sq, npv, cva, sol and nep) under both fuel scenarios BC and ML. For the management strategies where
different solution are possible (i.e. cva, sol and nep) two different combinations of effort multipliers are
displayed. Plain dots stand for one combination and empty dots for another. (a) Nephrops trawlers. (b)
Various fish trawlers. (c) Sole gill-netters. (d) Various fish gill-netters.
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Figure 5: Economic PEVA(u) versus ecological PPVA(u) performances of each management strategy under
both fuel scenarios. The blue dots represent the economic and ecological viabilities of each strategy under
the base case scenario and the red triangles under the most likely scenario.
3.1. Status quo strategy: not economically viable
Figures 7 to 9 show the projections to 2028, under the status quo strategy, of the
SSBs(t) of each species and the profits pi f (t) of each sub-fleet under base case and most
likely fuel scenarios, respectively. Figure 7 first illustrates that this strategy is almost
ecologically viable in the sense that the population viability probability is close to one
with PPVA(usq)= 98.5%. Only some trajectories for the Sole SSB violate the precautionary
threshold Bpa3 . The other species fluctuate in safety zones despite the uncertainties affect-
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Figure 6: Mean net present values NPV(u) versus co-viability probabilities PCVA(u) of each management
strategy under both fuel scenarios. The blue dots stand for the strategies under the base case scenario and
the red triangles under the most likely scenario.
ing their recruitment. In other words, the ecological risk is low. By contrast, figures 8 and
9 show that the economic viability of the fishery appears threatened under this strategy.
Indeed PEVA(usq)= 31.1 % under a base case fuel scenario and PEVA(usq)= 0 under a most
likely scenario (i.e. the fuel price increase projection). The latter outcome implies that for
every 1000 replicates of the strategy, at least one sub-fleet profit becomes negative during
a period of time over the projection period.
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Figure 7: Trajectories of the spawning stock biomass SSBs(t) of each species s (in thousands of tonnes) with
a status quo strategy (i.e. with usqf (t)= 1 for all f ). The viability thresholds are in red (i.e. Bpa reference
points by species). The set of possibilities that includes all of the 1000 simulated trajectories is represented
by the dark dotted lines and the grey field includes 95% of the trajectories. The green line is one particular
trajectory among the 1000 trajectories associated to the same set of ω(.) and ω˜(.) for each sub-figure of
figures 7 to 9. The lines in blue represent the estimated historical SSB for each species: Nephrops (s = 1),
Hake (s = 2) and Sole (s = 3).
3.2. npv strategy : high total net present value but not economically viable
As displayed by table 2 and figure 5, this strategy turns out to be ecologically viable
with a strong population viability probability PPVA(unpv)= 100 % as shown in figure 5.
Thus significant improvements in the status of stocks occur in the long run especially
for Nephrops and Sole species. However, even though the global net present value of
the fishery as a whole is higher than with other management strategies (c.f. figure 6),
the npv strategy is not economically viable for some sub-fleets, the profitability of which
vanishes. This leads to a collapse of the economic viability probability, as defined in
equation (15), with PEVA(unpv)= 0 % under both scenarios (table 2 and figure 5), and results
from the fact that the strategy requires these sub-fleets to become inactive (u f = 0), e.g.
the larger Nephrops trawlers or some of the various fish trawlers and Sole gill-netters as
illustrated in figure 4. This result, based on the structure of interactions and economic and
technical parameter values used in these simulations, seems to indicate that these sub-fleets
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Figure 8: Trajectories of the profits pi f (t) of each sub-fleet according to time t under a base case fuel scenario
BC with a status quo strategy (i.e. with usqf (t)= 1 for all f ). The viability thresholds are in red (i.e. zero,
strictly positive profits required). The set of possibilities that includes all of the 1000 simulated trajectories
is represented by the dark dotted line and the grey field includes 95% of the trajectories. The green line
is one particular trajectory among the 1000 trajectories associated to the same set of ω(.) and ω˜(.) for each
sub-figure of figures 7 to 9.
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Figure 9: Trajectories of the profits pi f (t) of each sub-fleet according to time t under a most likely fuel
scenario ML with a status quo strategy (i.e. with usqf (t)= 1 for all f ). The viability thresholds are in red
(i.e. zero, strictly positive profits required). The set of possibilities that includes all of the 1000 simulated
trajectories is represented by the dark dotted line and the grey field includes 95% of the trajectories. The
green line is one particular trajectory among the 1000 trajectories associated to the same set of ω(.) and ω˜(.)
for each sub-figure of figures 7 to 9.
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are relatively less efficient than other sub-fleets in the model; hence their contribution to
catches and landings under a npv strategy would be reduced to zero. In other words, the
lack of viable outcomes under such a npv strategy is due to intra-fleet heterogeneity, in
terms of technical efficiency, costs and prices. The various fish trawlers of 12-16 meters
and greater than 20 meters are active and see their capacity increase under a base case
scenario; however these sub-fleets become inactive under a most likely scenario, due to
their sensitivity to fuel prices as they use important quantities of fuel.
3.3. cva strategy: ecologically and economically viable
The effort multipliers combinations ucva associated to the cva management strategy
maximize the probability of co-viability, mixing ecological and economic constraints as
defined in equations (12) and (14). As expected, this strategy is ecologically viable with
guaranteed population viability (PPVA(ucva)= 100 %) as displayed in figure 5; i.e. biomass
trajectories lie above the precautionary thresholds Bpas for every species. Moreover the
economic performance of this strategy is also high, with an economic viability probability
superior to 95 % (PEVA(ucva) > 95 %) as illustrated in the figure 5. In 95 % of the cases,
every sub-fleet exhibits strictly positive profit throughout time. As shown in figure 4, such
bio-economic outcomes are obtained through redistributing fishing effort among the sub-
fleets. While no sub-fleet is made inactive, the strategy leads to significant reductions in
the capacity of some sub-fleets, mostly trawlers that have an important impact on modelled
species. Moreover, to reduce economic risk (i.e. to increase the probability of economic
viability), the sub-fleets with the most variability in their profit must decrease their capacity
under this strategy. Figure 6 shows that while the profitability of each fleet is guaranteed
and the economic risk is reduced, the global economic performance of the fishery (i.e.
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NPV) is smaller. Not surprisingly, the loss in NPV is stronger under a most likely scenario.
3.4. Sole strategy: not economically viable
The sol strategy involves mono-specific management targeting Sole as defined by
equation (21). Hence only effort multipliers related to Sole gill-netters ( f = 8,9,10,11)
are affected as presented in figure 4. The results suggests that the sub-fleet of smaller
Sole gill-netters ( f = 8,9,10) should be favoured under such a strategy. This strategy is
ecologically viable as PPVA(usol)= 100 % (figure 5). Similarly, the economic viability - in
particular for the smallest Sole gill-netter sub-fleets - is slightly improved as shown by the
figure 5 and table 2. However the strategy as a whole is not economically sustainable as
the economic viability probability PEVA(usol) varies between 31.5 and 31.7 % depending
on the effort multipliers combinations for a base case fuel scenario and is equal to zero
under a most likely scenario. Indeed, some sub-fleets, especially various fish gill-netters
do not benefit from the strategy as their fishing effort remains fixed.
3.5. Nephrops strategy: not economically viable
The nep strategy is a mono-specific management strategy targeting the Nephrops fish-
ery only, as defined by equation (23). Hence only effort multipliers u f for Nephrops
trawlers f = 1,2,3 are impacted by this strategy, as shown in figure 4. The results suggest
that the sub-fleet of smaller vessels f = 1 should be favoured while the sub-fleet of mod-
erate size trawlers should see its capacity slightly reduced. This especially occurs under a
most likely scenario. This strategy appears to be ecologically acceptable since it implies a
high overall population viability probability (98.4 < PPVA(unep) < 98.7%), although some
risks persist for Sole, like in the baseline sq, as stressed by figure 5. As expected, the status
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of the Nephrops stock is improved, especially under a most likely scenario where larger
Nephrops trawlers are subjected to more important capacity reduction. Similarly, the eco-
nomic viability for the Nephrops trawlers sub-fleets is maintained. However such a mono
specific strategy is not co-viable as defined here, since the profitability of other sub-fleets,
particularly for various fish gill-netters, is threatened, as in the status quo strategy. Note
however that nep and sol strategies display higher net present value than the status quo
strategy as shown in figure 6 under both fuel scenarios.
4. Discussion
4.1. Decision support for the Bay of Biscay mixed fishery
The modelling approach we propose to address trade-offs in managing the French Bay
of Biscay demersal fishery allows us to directly compare the biological and economic out-
comes of single-stock management strategies with the outcomes of management strategies
defined for the mix of species and fleets as a whole. More specifically, we can compare
management strategies which would attempt to manage the Nephrops fishery or the Sole
fishery separately - as has historically been the case until recent years - to two alterna-
tive fishery-wide management approaches aimed at (i) maximizing economic yield, or (ii)
adjusting the capacity of fishing sub-fleets so that both the biological and the economic
viability constraints can be met for every single species and sub-fleet.
Based on our simulations and regarding the species and fleets modelled, it appears that
the role of ecological constraints in determining viable management strategies is weak
as compared to economic constraints. This is confirmed by assessing the impact of the
ecological constraints on the different strategies u, through calculation of the difference
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PEVA(u) - PCVA(u) between the probability of economic viability and the probability of co-
viability based on values of the table 2. The fact that for strategies sq, npv and cva, this
difference is zero, suggests that the marginal impact of the ecological constraints is weak.
In other words, given the bio-economic situation of the fishery as captured in our model
for the late 2000s, sustainability risks in the fishery are rather economic.
Based on the data used to calibrate the model and economic assumptions of the model
(in particular assumptions on incomes from other species and on constant annual costs per
vessel), simulation results show that the status quo strategy - consisting of maintaining
fishing effort of all sub-fleets at their levels of the 2008 baseline - is not economically vi-
able. This outcome holds especially true under a most likely scenario where fuel increase
projection are taken into account. The results indicate that, given the status of the species
and fleets in 2008, and the nature of the technical interactions between fleets through by-
catch and discards, there appears to be excess capacity in the fishery as a whole. Hence
all alternative management strategies tested lead to some reduction in the capacity of the
fleets. These results are not surprising as the Bay of Biscay demersal fisheries have suf-
fered of chronic overcapacity (EC, 2009). These fisheries are currently managed through
total allowable catch limits, and a limited entry system for Nephrops and Sole fisheries.
However, management of the fisheries has historically been carried out per species, rather
than in an integrated, more cooperative, approach. Therefore, the current situation in the
fishery is probably relatively close to our simulated mono-specific management strategies,
in which attempts are made to maximize the profits of different fleets individually, with no
consideration for the global profit in the fishery as a whole. Under the new European man-
agement plan, future multi-species management definitions (EC, 2009) should improve
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the management of the Bay of Biscay demersal fisheries. The objective of such inte-
grated management strategies could for example be to achieve Maximum Economic Yield
(Grafton et al., 2010) at the scale of the fishery. However, our research highlights the ex-
istence of an alternative co-viability strategy which could be seen as more acceptable as it
entails less drastic adjustments in capacity across fleets and regions, at least in a transition
phase. The simulations allow to explore the trade-offs associated with alternative manage-
ment approaches. Single-species management strategies improve the bio-economic status
for the specific fishery they target, but do not achieve satisfactory results at the global scale.
While the Sole management strategy achieves ecological viability, it leads some sub-fleets
other than the Sole gill-netters to become unprofitable. Depending on its effort multipliers
combinations, the Nephrops management strategy produces better fishery-wide results as
regards the economic performance of the fleets, but still induces negative profits for some
sub-fleets, as well as a moderate level of risk that the ecological viability of the fishery
will not be guaranteed. The two fishery-wide strategies we examine produce strongly con-
trasted outcomes. The net present value strategy achieves its objective of maximizing high
level of economic performance for the overall fishery. Despite the management systems
in place, and a series of decommissioning plans which have been aimed at reducing the
capacity of these fleets, the fishery seems far from realising its Maximum Economic Yield
objective. Our approach provides an explanation for this, based on the observation that a
strategy aimed at maximizing the Net Present Value of profits derived from the fishery as
a whole would actually lead to quite heterogeneous impacts on the fleets and sub-fleets.
This management strategy can thus not be considered as economically viable in the sense
we have defined for the purpose of this analysis. This is because the strategy leads to stop
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certain sub-fleets entirely from fishing, in particular larger Nephrops trawlers, various fish
trawlers and certain sub-fleets of Sole gill-netters. Such an outcome is a direct result of the
differences in economic efficiency between sub-fleets and technical interactions between
them that were assumed in the model. The fact that this makes the npv strategy non-viable
can be interpreted as capturing the resistance which may develop against such a strategy
from the segments and regions of the fishery which would be negatively impacted. The
need to capture such constraints in bio-economic simulations of the potential benefits of
alternative fisheries management strategies has been increasingly recognised (see Martinet
et al. (2010) and Pe´reau et al. (2012) for recent applications).
Simulation results show that the co-viability strategy can be achieved by a number
of combinations of capacity adjustments, which all allow the ecological and economic
viability constraints to be met for all species and sub-fleets. The strategy however also
points to the need for a global reduction of capacity even if reallocations in effort are
not quite as drastic as the one suggested by the npv strategy, and allow some activity
to be maintained in all sub-fleets. This strategy might be expected to more easily achieve
consensus among the multiple stakeholders involved in the fishery. Indeed, the npv strategy
does not provide much flexibility in the selection of capacity reduction across fleets, so
leaves little room for negotiations. Circumstances under which such a strategy might
be expected to be more easily adopted would be where the owners of vessels belonging
to the sub-fleets which remain active and benefit from the adjustment could buy-out or
compensate the owners of those vessels that are requested to leave (Clark et al., 2005,
Martell et al., 2009). In this vein, Holland et al. (1999), Guyader et al. (2004), Squires
(2010) give examples where buybacks of vessels, licences, gear, access, and other use and
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property rights can be considered as a useful transition policy tool to address overcapacity,
overexploitation of fish stocks and distributional issues in fisheries.
The assumption of increasing fuel price, which is likely to occur, is detrimental to the
all the bio-economic outcomes of simulations, as captured in figures 5 and 6. However, it
does not change the nature of the qualitative outcomes and analysis.
4.2. Co-viability as step towards integrated management for mixed fisheries
It is increasingly recognised that a wide range of stakeholders are involved in fisheries
and their management, including industrial, artisanal, subsistence and recreational fisher-
men, suppliers and workers in allied industries, managers, scientists, environmentalists,
economists, public decision makers and the general public (Hilborn, 2007). Each of these
groups has an interest in particular outcomes from fisheries and the outcomes that are
considered desirable by one stakeholder may be undesirable to another group. The con-
sideration of this multi-dimensional nature of marine fisheries management appears as an
unavoidable reality, which should influence the nature of decision-support tools used to as-
sist in the decision-making processes associated with the selection of fisheries regulations.
The bio-economic modelling framework we propose offers both formal recognition of the
multi-objective nature of management strategies, and means to integrate this with current
understanding of the dynamics of a mixed fisheries system, in assessing the trade-offs as-
sociated with alternative approaches to regulate such systems. The model illustrates the
benefits of formally combining integrated bio-economic modelling with the multi-criteria
evaluation underlying the viability framework of analysis. This allows management strate-
gies to be assessed from a range of perspectives including the standard criteria of fish stock
preservation and fishery-level economic efficiency, as well as other dimensions which have
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less frequently been included in formal bio-economic modelling approaches, such as con-
cern for the maintenance of active and profitable fishing fleets. In addition, the viability
approach allows characterizing management strategies in terms of their degree of flexibil-
ity, with some management strategies offering more options than others in terms of im-
plementation. Since alternative options are bound to have different distributional impacts,
it could be expected that strategies offering more alternatives may stand better chances of
being adopted, as they provide greater “bargaining space” for the stakeholders to reach
consensus. In the simulation results obtained in this study, this is the case of the cva strat-
egy, which seems to provide greater adaptation options than the net present value strategy.
Such characteristics of management strategies would appear particularly important in the
context of mixed fisheries management, which application of the ecosystem approach re-
quires to be managed as a whole, rather than in separate component fisheries. It is likely
that models allowing alternative management strategies to be compared in this respect will
have greater chances to be adopted as decision support tools in the future.
4.3. Perspectives
To go further, several authors (e.g. Mullon et al. (2004), Cury et al. (2005), Chapel
et al. (2008)) have proposed the viability approach as a well-suited modelling framework
for Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management (EBFM). EBFM must manage targeted species
in the context of the overall state of the system, habitat, protected species, and non targeted
species. The dynamics considered can potentially include complex mechanisms such as
trophic interactions, competition, metapopulations dynamics or economic investment pro-
cess to quote a few. Here the focus is on technical interactions through a multi-fleets and
multi-species context, in particular the bycatch of hake by trawlers. For this specific case-
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study, the comparison of mono-specific approaches for Sole or Nephrops with the more
integrated perspective of cva stresses the importance of integrating management across
the complex set of interactions that define these fisheries. Several expansions of this bio-
economic model could be considered which could provide useful insights in support of
an ecosystem approach to the management of the Bay of Biscay demersal fisheries. This
could include the addition of other important commercial demersal species - for example
Anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius and L. budegassa) which is another key species landed
by some fleets. Moreover, many studies relating to trawling show that this fishing tech-
nique can also impact habitats, through re-suspension of the sediments, and impacts on the
structure of benthic communities (Collie et al., 2000) that entail variations inthe ecological
production processes (Jennings et al., 2001). Therefore it could be important to also con-
sider the ecological impacts of trawling in the evaluation of management strategies, which
would mean including both the interactions between fishing levels and patterns across sub-
fleets and the benthic habitats, and identifying levels of acceptable impacts on the basis of
which to set additional viability constraints. On the human side of the analysis, it could
also be important to explicitly capture the Spanish and Belgian fleets, if the approach is
to become relevant as a decision-support tool for joint management of the Bay of Biscays
fisheries. In addition, the assumption of constant effort over time should be relaxed in
order to promote more adaptive strategies.
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Appendix—————————————————————————————–
AppendixA. Bio-economic model parameters
This appendix displays the values of the biological and economic parameters used to
calibrate the bio-economic model presented in section 2.2. Tables A.1 to A.3 show the
parameters values of stock dynamics and average market price by species and by age.
Tables A.4 to A.6 give the estimated values of fishing mortalities by species, by age and
by sub-fleet. The biological reference points Blims , B
pa
s and average historical recruitment
Rs for every species are displayed in table A.7. Tables A.8 to A.10 show the estimated
values of discard rates by species, by age and by sub-fleet. And tables A.11 and A.12 give
the values of the economic parameters and fishing effort in 2008 for every sub-fleet.
Table A.1: Nephrops parameters (s = 1), t0 = 2008. Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, DPMA .
Age a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Initial abund. N1,a(t0) (∗103 indv) 642616 650008 328988 180528 65279 23173 8304 4257 4679
Maturity γ1,a 0 0 0,75 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mean weight(kg\ indv) υ1,a 0,004 0,009 0,016 0,027 0,037 0,046 0,058 0,068 0,091
Natural mortality M1,a 0,3 0,3 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25
Age price coefficient Υ1,a 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.4 1.4 1.68
Mean price(e\ kg) µP1 10.46
Standard deviation price(e\ kg) σP1 0.453
Table A.2: Hake parameters (s = 2), t0 = 2008. Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, DPMA.
Age a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Initial abund. N2,a(t0) (∗103 indv) 236062 132608 61571 25195 5219 1606 497 162 45
Maturity γ2,a 0 0,11 0,73 0,93 0,99 1 1 1 1
Mean weight(kg\ indv) υ2,a 0,029 0,25 0,716 1,572 2,503 3,452 4,393 5,773 6,747
Natural mortality M2,a 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
Age price coefficient Υ2,a 0.54 0.54 0.79 1.11 1.49 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87
Mean price(e\ kg) µP2 3.69
Standard deviation price(e\ kg) σP2 0.78
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Table A.3: Sole parameters (s = 3), t0 = 2008. Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, DPMA.
Age a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Initial abund. N3,a(t0) (∗103 indv) 23191 17416 10707 4864 3425 2627 2590
Maturity γ3,a 0,32 0,83 0,97 1 1 1 1
Mean weight(kg\ indv) υ3,a 0,189 0,241 0,297 0,352 0,423 0,449 0,599
Natural mortality M3,a 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Age price coefficient Υ3,a 0.69 0.82 0.99 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.12
Mean price(e\ kg) µP3 12.41
Standard deviation price(e\ kg) σP3 0.8
Table A.4: The values of fishing mortality on Nephrops (s = 1): F1,a, f (t0). Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH,
2008.
Fleets
```````sub-fleets
Age a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Nephrops
trawlers
09-12 m 0.002 0.027 0.039 0.039 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
12-16 m 0.01 0.161 0.233 0.232 0.205 0.206 0.207 0.209 0.209
16-20 m 0.004 0.057 0.083 0.083 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.074
Various fish
trawlers
0-12 m 0 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
12-16 m 0.002 0.03 0.044 0.043 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
16-20 m 0.002 0.035 0.051 0.051 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046
sup 20 m 0 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sole
gill-netters
0-10 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10-12 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12-18 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18-24 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Various fish
gill-netters
0-10 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10-12 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12-18 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18-24 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sup 24 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other fleets 0.001 0.015 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
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Table A.5: The values of fishing mortality on Hake (s = 2): F2,a, f (t0). Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, 2008.
Fleets
```````sub-fleets
Age a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Nephrops
trawlers
09-12 m 0.009 0.004 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0
12-16 m 0.051 0.026 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
16-20 m 0.033 0.016 0.004 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Various fish
trawlers
0-12 m 0.016 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 0 0 0
12-16 m 0.018 0.015 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.001 0 0 0
16-20 m 0.016 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 0 0 0
sup 20 m 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.002 0 0 0 0
Sole
gill-netters
0-10 m 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0
10-12 m 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.001 0 0 0
12-18 m 0 0 0 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 0 0
18-24 m 0 0 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.001 0
Various fish
gill-netters
0-10 m 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.001 0 0 0
10-12 m 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.001 0 0 0
12-18 m 0 0 0 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 0 0
18-24 m 0 0 0.005 0.025 0.044 0.023 0.008 0.003 0.002
sup 24 m 0 0.001 0.013 0.067 0.119 0.062 0.022 0.009 0.005
Other fleets 0.022 0.253 0.444 0.734 0.764 0.843 0.728 0.875 0.88
Table A.6: The values of fishing mortality on Sole (s = 3): F3,a, f (t0). Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, 2008.
Fleets
```````sub-fleets
Age a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Nephrops
trawlers
09-12 m 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
12-16 m 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
16-20 m 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Various fish
trawlers
0-12 m 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.01 0.007 0.007 0.007
12-16 m 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013
16-20 m 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015
sup 20 m 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006
Sole
gill-netters
0-10 m 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.009 0.011
10-12 m 0.011 0.028 0.042 0.045 0.053 0.052 0.059
12-18 m 0.018 0.065 0.087 0.094 0.148 0.145 0.138
18-24 m 0.015 0.054 0.072 0.078 0.123 0.121 0.115
Various fish
gill-netters
0-10 m 0 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
10-12 m 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007
12-18 m 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006
18-24 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sup 24 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other fleets 0.062 0.113 0.072 0.072 0.09 0.079 0.083
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Table A.7: Biological reference points Blims , B
pa
s and mean recruitment Rs for every species. This last one is
computed over 1987-2006 for the Nephrops, 1992-2006 for the Hake and 1993-2006 for the Sole. Source:
ICES; Ifremer, SIH.
Nephrops Hake Sole
Blims (tons) 7733 54521 9706
Bpas (tons) 7733 75784 13000
Rs (103 individuals) 699387 241776 23414
Table A.8: Estimated discard in percentage for Nephrops (s = 1): d1,a, f . Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, 2008.```````Main fleets
Age a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Nephrops trawlers 0.999 0.972 0.344 0.063 0.023 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.01
Various fish trawlers 0.999 0.972 0.344 0.063 0.023 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.01
Sole gill-netters 0.999 0.972 0.344 0.063 0.023 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.01
Various fish gill-netters 0.999 0.972 0.344 0.063 0.023 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.01
Table A.9: Estimated discard in percentage for Hake (s = 2): d2,a, f . Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, 2008.```````Main fleets
Age a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Nephrops trawlers 0.999 0.374 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Various fish trawlers 0.998 0.237 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Sole gill-netters 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Various fish gill-netters 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Table A.10: Estimated discard in percentage for Sole (s = 3): d3,a, f . Source: ICES; Ifremer, SIH, 2008.```````Main fleets
Age a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Nephrops trawlers 0.15 0.01 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Various fish trawlers 0.15 0.01 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Sole gill-netters 0.15 0.01 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
Various fish gill-netters 0.15 0.01 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
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Table A.11: Initial number of vessels K f (t0), effort by vessel e f (t0) and rate of extra fishing income α f of
the sixteen sub-fleets. Source: Ifremer, SIH, DPMA, 2008.
Fleets length(m)
nb vessel
K f (t0)
fishing effort/ vessel
(nb day at sea)
e f (t0)
income from other species
(in e/ effort unit)
α f
Nephrops trawlers
f = 1, 2, 3
09-12 m 19 170.3 297
12-16 m 75 183.4 429
16 -20 m 22 177. 716
Various fish
trawlers f = 4, 5, 6, 7
0-12 m 110 157.7 622
12-16 m 45 192.7 1375
16-20 m 49 180.3 1751
sup 20 m 37 197.1 3597
Sole gill-netters
f = 8, 9, 10, 11
0-10 m 28 139. 311
10-12 m 42 145.5 503
12-18 m 40 202.9. 765
18-24 m 23 201.7 1150
Various fish gill-netters
f = 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
0-10 m 32 153.8 303
10-12 m 30 178.8 847
12-18 m 6 145. 1466
18-24 m 9 210.3 1500
sup 24 m 10 260.6 1141
Table A.12: Mean reference costs of the sixteen sub-fleets. Source: Ifremer, SIH, DPMA, 2008
Fleets length(m)
landing cost
τ f
volume of fuel
(in L / effort unit)
V f uelf
variable cost
by vessel
(in e/ effort unit)
cvarf
annual costs
by vessel
(in e)
c f ixf
Nephrops trawlers
f = 1, 2, 3
09-12 m 0.04 482 58 101837
12-16 m 0.05 653 81 174104
16-20m 0.07 925 160 234836
Various fish
trawlers f = 4, 5, 6, 7
0-12 m 0.05 257 44 77779
12-16 m 0.05 863 108 218506
16-20 m 0.07 1076 188 245285
sup 20 m 0.07 1999 308 388951
Sole gill-netters
f = 8, 9, 10, 11
0-10 m 0.06 78 70 56601
10-12 m 0.05 290 140 132326
12-18 m 0.08 348 213 256373
18-24 m 0.07 622 453 378872
Various fish gill-netters
f = 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
0-10 m 0.05 59 28 42874
10-12 m 0.05 248 69 111911
12-18 m 0.06 396 230 223622
18-24 m 0.07 811 595 513353
sup 24 m 0.03 1099 556 913096
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